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the procedural matters concerning costs, notice to the members of
the class, disposition of damages, which need to be looked into
and resolved.
Class actions in Canada have enjoyed a recent resurgence of in-
terest, partly as a response to the introduction of the federal
amendment to the Combines Investigation Act and partly as a re-
sult of the trend in the United States where the class action is a
major weapon for consumer and environmental groups. Some of
the recent Canadian decisions which upheld the status of the rep-
resentative action appeared to indicate that the courts would be
willing to be innovative in attempting to overcome the problems
presented by the Markt case. The Divisional Court in Naken, how-
ever, by refusing to consider the policy issues involved in deter-
mining whether to permit consumer class actions in the 1970's,
may have effectively slammed the door to any further judicial in-
novations. Therefore, it is now up to consumers to pressure their
respective provincial governments to introduce new and effective
class action procedures. Quebec has led the way by introducing in
December, 1977, innovative legislation dealing with class actions
which will also provide financial assistance, in the form of an ad-
vance, for the preparation and presentation of a class action when
such costs are beyond the means of a plaintiff. In Ontario and
British Columbia the class action procedure is presently under re-
view by their respective law reform commissions.
Robert S. Reid*
CLOSE BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A PURCHASE-
MONEY LENDER AND A SELLER OF GOODS -
BANK OF MONTREAL v. KON
I
Today, sixteen years after the landmark decision of Federal Dis-
count Corp. Ltd. v. St. Pierre' and eight years after the enactment
of Part V of the Bills of Exhange Act,2 thorny and fundamental is-
sues relating to the subjection of a purchase-money lender 3 to
* Professor of Law, University of British Columbia.
'(1962), 32 D.L.R. (2d) 86, [1962] O.R. 310 (C.A.) (hereafter: Federal Discount). The case
was commented on by Ivan and Kristine Feltham, 40 Can. Bar Rev. 461 (1962), at p. 469.
2 R.S.C. 1970, (1st Supp.) (hereafter: Part V, the Act). Part V contains ss. 188-192.
3 A person who lends money that enables a debtor to buy goods from another, is a pur-
Commentary 91
claims and defences arising from the financed contract for sale,
have remained unresolved. Neither the doctrinal basis of this sub-
jection, nor the range of circumstances where it operates, has been
satisfactorily settled.
A recent reminder of this unsettled state of the law was given by
the Trial Division of the Supreme Court of Alberta (Judicial Dis-
trict of Calgary) in Bank of Montreal v. Kon4 where the facts were
as follows:
Maple Leaf, a private company ... developed a plan whereby the com-
pany sold motor homes to purchasers who leased them back to the compa-
ny. The purchase of the motor homes was financed by loans made by the
[Bank of Montreal] to the various purchasers. The company rented the mo-
tor homes to users, applying the revenues from the rentals in part, on
monthly payments to the bank on the various promissory notes evidencing
the loans and in part on repairs, maintenance and other expenses for the
motor homes. In a written agreement entered into between the purchasers
and Maple Leaf it was provided that the loans were to be paid off out of the
rentals over a four-year period, after which the company was entitled to
rentals from the motor homes for one year and they would then revert to the
purchaser. All of the loans were secured by chattel mortgages.
In addition to financing the purchase of these motor homes, the bank
granted commercial loans to Maple Leaf to finance its operations.
In the fall of 1973 ... Maple Leaf found itself unable to keep up the
monthly payments to the bank on the various promissory notes.
The bank proposed a six-month moratorium on payments on these loans
to which the borrowers agreed. This required re-financing of the outstanding
promissory notes. It was effected by their replacement with new promissory
notes based on the amounts owing as at the date of the re-financing. 5
The financing of the purchases by the Bank of Montreal was
made under an arrangement with Maple Leaf. Pursuant to that ar-
rangement, the bank established a consumer lending branch one
office space distant from Maple Leaf's premises. In some cases
prospective borrowers were met by a bank officer on Maple Leaf's
premises. Maple Leaf, on its part, referred the potential purchas-
ers of motor homes to the bank and supplied it with basic credit
information with respect to them. The refinancing documents
were signed by the borrowers on Maple Leaf's premises on ap-
pointments made by Maple Leaf. To those borrowers who had re-
ceived the original purchase-money loans from another bank, it
chase-money lender: cf Bills of Exchange Act, s. 189(3)(a); Ontario Personal Property Se-
curity Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 344, s. l(s)(ii).
4 (1978), 82 D.L.R. (3d) 609, [197812 W.W.R. 503 (Alta. S.C.T.D.) (hereafter: Kon).
5 Ibid., at pp. 610-11 D.L.R., pp. 504-5 W.W.R.
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was suggested by Maple Leaf that they refinance with the Bank of
Montreal. Payments on the promissory notes were made to the
Bank of Montreal by Maple Leaf.6
Upon the failure of Maple Leaf and following its unauthorized
sale of some of the motor homes and conversion of the proceeds,
the Bank of Montreal moved to collect from the purchasers-bor-
rowers themselves. Exercising a right under an acceleration clause
inserted into each borrower's promissory note, it sued them all for
the outstanding balances. The defence offered was that "The close
connections between the Bank of Montreal and Maple Leaf de-
prives the Bank of Montreal of all defences to the equities of the
respective transactions" and that "The notes were not endorsed
'consumer purchase' as required by the provisions of s. 190 of the
Bills of Exchange Act and are therefore invalid."7 Rejecting these
arguments and deciding for the plaintiff bank against the purchas-
ers-borrowers, Kirby, J., held that as none of the purchases of the
motor homes by the respective defendants was a "consumer
purchase ' 8 the rights of the bank were not governed by Part V of
the Act.9 Then, though conceding that apart from consumer pur-
chases the Federal Discount doctrine "continues to apply",10 he
went on to say that "[t]o bring the relationship within the Federal
Discount doctrine the evidence must establish or warrant the infer-
ence that the Bank of Montreal was a party to the wrongful acts of
Maple Leaf or knew, or ought to have known, of the wrongful
acts; the wrongful acts being the conversion of the proceeds from
6 "The ... particulars of the close connections existing between the Bank of Montreal and
Maple Leaf' as enumerated by the defendants are set forth in Kon at pp. 621-2 D.L.R.,
pp. 519-20 W.W.R.
7 Ibid., at p. 612 D.L.R., p. 507 W.W.R. Other defences, all rejected by the court (pp. 613-18
D.L.R., pp. 508-13 W.W.R.) were that the notes were not unconditional, their delivery
was not unconditional, presentment for payment was not proved, absence of considera-
tion, and the election of the bank to seize rather than sue. This comment will not deal
with the treatment of these issues.
8 Defined in s. 188 of the Act as follows:
188. In this Part "consumer purchase" means a purchase, other than a cash purchase,
of goods or services or an ageement to purchase goods or services,
(a) by an individual other than for resale or for use in the course of his busi-
ness, profession or calling, and
(b) from a person who is engaged in the business of selling or providing those
goods or services.
9 Kon, supra, footnote 4 at p. 630 D.L.R., p. 529 W.W.R.
10 Ibid. "[T]he Federal Discount doctrine," subjecting the claim of a purchase-money
financer to the performance of the financed contract of sale by the seller with whom he
has a certain "relationship", will be discussed in Parts IIl-V of this comment.
Commentary 93
the sale to the motor homes belonging to the respective
defendants."" Therefore, it was held, "the relationship between
the bank and Maple Leaf does not come within the Federal
Discount doctrine with respect to the transactions between Maple
Leaf and the respective defendants."' 12
II
In so far as the court limited the application of Part V only to a
"consumer purchase", as defined in s. 188 of the Act,' a its con-
struction of the legislative mandate appears sound. Indeed, the
opposite view expressed in Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
v. Lively, 14 under which s. 189(3) extends the coverage of Part V to
every purchase-money loan given by a lender who does not deal
with the seller "at arm's length", 15 is unconvincing. It is unsup-
ported by the legislative history 16 and is even rejected by the lan-
guage of s. 189(3) which explicitly speaks of a loan given "to ena-
ble the purchaser to make the consumer purchase."'I7 Also notewor-
Ibid., at p. 630 D.L.R., p. 530 W.W.R. These "wrongful acts" of Maple Leaf, i.e., the sale
of some motor homes without turning over the proceeds to the defendants, are originally
set forth in the account of the facts at p. 611 D.L.R., p. 505 W.W.R.
12 Ibid., at p. 632 D.L.R., p. 532 W.W.R. While the plaintiff bank was held entitled to judg-
ment on each of the promissory notes, each of the defendants was held to be entitled to
indemnification by Maple Leaf and one of its officers, Falasconi: at pp. 632-4 D.L.R., pp.
532-4 W.W.R.
13 Supra, footnotes 8-9.
14 (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d) 432 at pp. 438-9, 19 N.S.R. (2d) 400 (S.C.T.D.) (hereafter: Lively).
15 S. 189(3)(b) of the Act. Section 189(3) reads in full as follows:
(3) Without limiting or restricting the circumstances in which, for the purposes of this
Part, a bill of exchange or a promissory note shall be considered to be issued in respect of
a consumer purchase, a bill of exchange or promissory note shall be conclusively pre-
sumed to be so issued if
(a) the consideration for its issue was the lending or advancing of money or
other valuable security by a person other than the seller, in order to ena-
ble the purchaser to make the consumer purchase; and
(b) the seller and the person who lent or advanced the money or other val-
uable security were, at the time the bill or note was issued, not dealing
with each other at arm's length within the meaning of the Income Tax
Act.
16 In adopting s. 189(3) Parliament's intention was not to let a merchant and a financer cir-
cumvent the provisions of Part V by moving from purchase of retail paper to direct pur-
chase-money loans (cf Part V of this comment, infra); J. Ziegel, "Consumer Notes -
Bill C-208 - Bills of Exchange Amendment Act", 49 Can. Bar Rev. 121 (1971), at pp.
124-6 (hereafter: Ziegel, Bill C-208). The scope of the direct loan provision is therefore
no broader than that dealing with negotiable instruments given to sellers.
17 S. 189(3)(a), emphasis added. Had the subsection read "... to make the purchase" (with-
out mentioning "consumer" before "purchase"), the Lively interpretation would have
been technically possible.
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thy in connection with Kon is the judicial sanction given by Kirby,
J., to the view that "the Federal Discount doctrine" continues to
apply in cicumstances not covered by Part V of the Act.' 8 Yet the
decision given in Kon has two troublesome aspects.
First, the scope of "consumer purchase" as defined in s. 188 was
read by the court quite narrowly. Finding that "the primary pur-
pose underlying the purchase of the motor homes was to lease
them to Maple Leaf to be rented out", that "The defendants were
all cognizant of the income tax benefits that were to be derived
from the motor homes, and took advantage of them", and that
"The use of the particular motor home by a purchaser was an inci-
dental benefit", the court concluded that the purchases "cannot be
considered to have been 'consumer purchases' within the meaning
of s. 188."19 Nevertheless, in defining "consumer purchase", s. 188
does not use language explicitly limiting its scope to a purchase of
goods "for use primarily for personal, family, or household
purposes". 20 Instead, every purchase of goods "by an individual
other than for resale or for use in the course of his business, pro-
fession or calling" is a "consumer purchase" under s. 188.21 This
seems to cover a purchase relating to a business opportunity made
not in the ordinary course of business of the purchaser. What is
excluded from the coverage of the s. 188 definition is a purchase
by an individual in the course of his business and not every pur-
chase made for a business purpose.22 Moreover, on the facts of the
case, the Maple Leaf plan was designed not to provide a source of
income to the defendants, but rather, to enable them to pay for
the motor homes23 that after five years were to revert to their own
personal use.
18 See footnote 10, supra. The view was already expressed by Ziegel, Bill C-208, supra, foot-
note 16 at p. 134.
19 Kon, supra, footnote 4 at p. 630 D.L.R., p. 529 W.W.R.
20 See definition of "consumer goods" under s. I(e) of the Ontario Personal Property Secu-
rity Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 344. as well as under §9-109(1) of the American U.C.C. Cf. also
definition of "consumer" in the U.S. federal Consumer Credit Protection Act § 103(h),
Pub. Law 90-321, 82 Stat. 146; and definitions in §§ 1.301(12)(a)(iii), 1.301(15)(a)(ii) of the
proposed American Uniform Consumer Credit Code, Working Redraft No. 5 (1973).
21 See footnote 8, supra. The other elements of the definition are not relevant in the present
discussion.
22 Arguably, the purchases excluded from the definition in s. 188 are those made by buyers
dealing with the relevant kind of goods in the ordinary course of their business so as to be
charged with knowledge and skill with respect to them; cf definitions of "Merchant" and
"Between merchants" in §2-104 of the American U.C.C.
23 See footnote 5 and text, supra. In this respect Kon differed from Lively where the court
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Secondly, and this is where the focus of this comment lies,
though conceding that the Federal Discount doctrine is applicable
to circumstances falling outside Part V, the court viewed the scope
of the doctrine in an alarmingly restrictive manner.24 The impor-
tance of this aspect of the decision becomes apparent once the
limits of Part V are realized. Thus, not only non-consumer pur-
chases, but also many purchase-money loans that are advanced to
finance consumer purchases, fall outside the scope of Part V. This
is so since under s. 189(3)(b) the application of Part V to a pur-
chase-money lender depends also on whether he and the seller are
"not dealing with each other at arm's length within the meaning of
the Income Tax Act. '25 Read as limited to "those situations where
one person or corporation has control ... over another" 26 the "not
dealing . . . at arm's length" requirement appears extremely
restrictive. 27 In addition, consumer credit arrangements not in-
volving promissory notes or bills of exchange, as in the case of
lender credit-card plans, are not governed at all by Part V.
Confusion regarding the scope of consumer purchases that fall
within the ambit of Part V of the Act has been added by a British
Columbia County Court's recent holding that since "a cash
purchase" is excluded from the s. 188 definition of "consumer
purchase", Part V is inapplicable to situations "where payment for
the goods was made and accepted as payment in full by the seller
and the goods were delivered at that time and title thereto passed
to the purchaser. '28 This conclusion, the result of the reference to
concluded that the purchase of the animals was designed "to make money out of them";
supra, footnote 14 at p. 438. Yet, as in Kon, Lively supports the view, contested in the text
above, that Part V does not apply to a purchase relating to a business opportunity made
not in the ordinary course of business of the purchaser; ibid.
24 See footnotes 10-11 and text, supra.
25 But see Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Langlois (1977), 2 B.C.L.R. 83 (S.C.);
Canadian Acceptance Corp. Ltd v. Galbiati, [1977] 1 W.W.R. 280 (Sask. Dist. Ct.) where
the scope of types of loans covered by Part V was not read to be limited by s. 189(3)(b).
Both cases were convincingly criticized by J. Ziegel, "Consumer Notes and Part V of the
Bills of Exchange Act - More Trouble Abrewing", 2 C.B.L.J. 262 (1977) (hereafter: Zie-
gel, Part V).
26 Lively, supra, footnote 14 at p. 440.
27 For the impropriety of the tests under the Income Tax Act, cf in general: B. Hansen,
"Factual Non-Arm's Length Relationships in Canadian Business Statutes", 2 C. B. L.J.
278 (1978) and citations there. Quaere, whether courts cannot read the Federal Discount
doctrine into s. 189(3)(b): Ziegel, Bill C-208, supra, footnote 16 at p. 125.
28 Royal Bank of Canada v. Siemens (1978), 82 D.L.R. (3d) 527 at p. 535, [1978] 2 W.W.R.
298 at pp. 307-8 (B.C. Co. Ct.). Though this is the literal meaning of s. 189(3)(a) (footnote
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"consumer purchase" in s. 189(3)(a), would mean that the applica-
bility of Part V of the Act to an instrument evidencing a pur-
chase-money loan, depends on whether credit has also been ex-
tended to the consumer by the seller.
Last, but not least, even when Part V applies to the rights of
purchase-money lenders, its effect on them is far from certain. Un-
der s. 191, "the right of a holder of a consumer bill or consumer
note that is marked as required by section 190 ... is subject to any
defence ... that the purchaser would have had in an action by the
seller on the consumer bill or consumer note. '29 This is something
quite unintelligible, if not entirely meaningless, in the context of a
bill or note evidencing a loan. Thus, due to the plain language of s.
191, notwithstanding the intention of its draftsinen, rights of the
lender suing on an instrument covered by Part V, may turn on the
applicability of the Federal Discount doctrine. Besides, as on the
dishonour of an instrument the right on the basic transaction is
revived, 30 and as Part V is only concerned with the enforceability
of the consumer instrument and does not purport to affect the
right on the underlying debt, the lender may circumvent Part V by
suing on the underlying loan transaction rather than on the instru-
ment evidencing it.31 His rights will then be determined under the
Federal Discount doctrine. This appears to be the law at least
where the lender holds an instrument which has not been voided
under s. 190(2),32 for this is an unquestionable situation where the
instrument is said to be dishonoured by non-payment so as to re-
vive the underlying obligation.33
15, supra), the construction is contrary to Parliament's intention in adopting s. 189(3);
see footnote 16, supra.
29 Emphasis added. Section 190(1) requires that "Every consumer bill or consumer note
shall be prominently and legibly marked on its face with the words 'Consumer Purchase'
before or at the time when the instrument is signed by the purchaser ...." A consumer
bill and a consumer note are basically, a bill of exchange and a promissory note "issued
in respect of a consumer purchase": s. 189(1) and (2).
30 See in general: Falconbridge on Banking and Bills of Exchange, 7th ed., Rogers ed. (To-
ronto, Canada Law Book Ltd. 1969), p. 798.
31 Ziegel, Bill C-208, supra, footnote 16 at p. 129; Ziegel, Part V, supra, footnote 25 at p.
267. Quaere, whether the federal Parliament is competent to deal with the rights on the
underlying debt, ibid. See now also the decision of Cowan, C.J.T.D., in Re David
Maclaren, Action No. B. 4075, April 19, 1978 (N.S.).
32 Under s. 190(2), "A consumer bill or consumer note that is not marked as required by
this section is void, except in the hands of a holder in due course" or against a drawee,
both without a notice of its origin. See footnote 29, supra.
33 Whether the underlying transaction is revived also upon non-payment of an instrument
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Indeed, a broad spectrum of situations may fall outside Part V
of the Act. To the extent that any of them is not governed by a di-
rect provincial statute, it is subject to an examination under the
Federal Discount doctrine. For this reason, the restrictive view
thereof expressed in Kon by Kirby, J., cannot pass without a re-
sponse, undertaken in this comment.
III
In Federal Discount a promissory note evidencing a sale of a
home knitting machine was negotiated by the payee-seller to the
plaintiff finance company. Denying the finance company a holder
in due course status 34 the Ontario Court of Appeal, per Kelly, J.A.,
introduced into Canadian law what has been known in the United
States35 as the "close connectedness" doctrine.36
The doctrine originated and has primarily been applied in cases
involving promissory notes issued by consumers in return for
goods and then negotiated by the payees-sellers to sale finance
companies. Upon the finding of a close business relationship be-
tween a payee-seller and a finance company taker-of-the note, the
effect of the doctrine has been to deny the latter a holder in due
course status and thereby to subject it to the defences of the buyer
arising from the sale agreement. 37
The exact elements of the close business connection have never
been determined. The cases tend to consider combinations of cer-
tain factors, such as the drafting of the forms by the finance com-
pany, the approval or the establishment by it of the seller's sales
that has been voided by statute is quite unclear. Cf. F. Kessler, E. H. Levi, and E. E. Fer-
guson, "Some Aspects of Payment by Negotiable Instrument: A Comparative Study", 45
Yale L.J. 1373 (1936), at p. 1396; failure of the holder to carry the various formalities
(presentment, notice) results in the discharge of the endorser also on the underlying
obligation.
34 A holder in due course is one not a party to the basic transaction who takes an instru-
ment by negotiation, in good faith, for value and without notice of a defect in the title of
the person who negotiated it; see the detailed formula in s. 56(l) of the Act, R.S.C. 1970,
c. B-5. A holder in due course "holds the bill [instrument] free from any defect of title of
prior parties, as well as from mere personal defences available to prior parties among
themselves ... ": s. 74(b). He can recover from the obligor over his defences against the
payee.
35 The reliance in Federal Discount on the American cases is quite obvious from the report
of the case; Federal Discount, supra, footnote I at p. 100 D.L.R., p. 324 O.R.
36 In general, for summary of U.S. cases, see J. White and R. Summers, Handbook of the
Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code (West Publishing Co., 1972), pp. 479-84.
37 Ibid.
4-3 C.B.L.J.
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practices and procedures, the substantial transfer of retail paper
by the seller, a connected ownership or management or a family
relationship, and more generally, the existence of mutuality of in-
terest of the seller and finance company.38 What has always been
emphasized, however, is the control by the finance company of the
seller's scheme of selling on credit terms,39 which indicates the
financer's involvement in the credit arrangement from its
inception. 40 Thus it was said in Unico v. Owen,4° the doctrine will
apply
... when it appears from the totality of the arrangements between dealer and
financer that the financer has had a substantial voice in setting standards for
the underlying transaction, or has approved the standards established by the
dealer, and has agreed to take all or a predetermined br substantial quantity
of the negotiable paper which is backed by such standards....
Some cases were concerned with situations where the close busi-
ness association with the seller gave the finance company access to
facts raising a suspicion of fraud. 42 In denying a holder in due
course status to the holder of the note, courts applied well estab-
lished standards of knowledge and lack of good faith. 43 Notwith-
standing Kon,44 this situation has nothing to do with Federal
Discount where Kelly, J., explicitly based his decision on the as-
sumption that the finance company "did not have actual notice of
facts the knowledge of which would have prevented it from be-
38 In general for the elements of "close connectedness", see White and Summers, supra,
footnote 36 at p. 481; Feltham, supra, footnote I at pp. 479.81; Mooney, "Judicial and
Statutory Limitations on the Rights of a 'Holder in Due Course' in Consumer
Transactions", 11 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 90 (1970), at p. 99. In general, for the work-
ing relations between car dealers and finance companies, see Shuchman, "Profit On De-
fault: An Archival Study of Automobile Repossession and Resale", 22 Stanford L. Rev.
20 (1969), at pp. 24-6.
39 See e.g., White and Summers, supra, footnote 36 at p. 483. On the other hand, "the mere
supplying of negotiable forms in blank by the financing company to a vendor is [not]
sufficient to strip the financing company of its holder in due course status"; Westfield Inv.
Co. v. Fellers, 181 A.2d 809 at p. 815 (1962, N.J.S.C. Law Div.).
40 But cf footnote 88 and text, infra, control on credit terms as an independent additional
prerequisite. Anyway, control of the credit terms should be distinguished from control
over the seller; see footnote 26 and text, supra.
41 232 A. 2d 405 (1967, N.J.S.C.) at p. 417.
42 See e.g., Norman v. World Wide Distributors Inc., 195 A. 2d 115 (1963, S.C. Pa.).
43 See e.g., London Joint Stock Bank v. Simmons, [1892] A.C. 201 at p. 221, cited in Bank of
Montreal v. Normandin, [19251 3 D.L.R. 975 at p. 979, [1925] S.C.R. 587 at p. 592: "If
there be anything which excites the suspicion that there is something wrong in the trans-
action, the taker of the instrument is not acting in good faith if he shuts his eyes to the
facts presented to him and puts the suspicions aside without further enquiry."
44 See footnote I I and text, supra.
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coming a holder in due course." 45 Also, the close connectedness
doctrine does not necessarily mean that an objective standard of
good faith should be applied to a sale finance company having a
close business relationship with the seller.46 As this explanation is
contrary to the language of the Act,47 it has been criticized as un-
warranted judicial legislation.48
Indeed, the involvement in the arrangement from its inception
is by itself the key to the doctrine. In order to invoke it, the buyer
"must show that the seller contemplated that the credit would in
fact be advanced by, and the note in fact held by, the particular
financing institution involved." 49 For, in addition to satisfying the
statutory conditions of taking the note in good faith and for value
and without notice of a defect of title,50 a holder in due course
must be a remote, as distinguished from an immediate, party to the
underlying transaction.51  Thus, in the landmark case of
Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs,52 the sale finance company
"financed the deal, prepared the instrument, and on the day it was
executed took an assignment of it from the ... [seller]. Even before
it was executed it prepared the written assignment thereon to
itself." Under these circumstances, the plaintiff finance company
was denied a holder in due course status since "Rather than being
a purchaser of the instrument after its execution it was to all in-
tents and purposes a party to the agreement and the instrument
from the beginning. ' '53
45 Federal Discount, supra, footnote I at p. 100 D.L.R., p. 324 O.R.
46 The idea of an objective standard of good faith in the case of purchaser of consumer pa-
per was promoted by N. 0. Littlefield, "Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The
Failure of the Subjective Test", 39 So. Cal.L. Rev. 48 (1966). Cf Kaw Valley State Bank
& Trust Co. v. Riddle, 549 P. 2d 927 (1976, S.C. Kan.), objective standard of "notice".
47 S. 3 of the Act provides that "A thing is deemed to be done in good faith within the
meaning of this Act, where it is in fact done honestly whether it is done negligently or not".
Emphasis added.
48 See e.g., H. Kripke, "Chattel Paper as a Negotiable Specialty Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code", 59 Yale L.J. 1209 (1950), at p. 1220. Kripke's criticism was made in the
American context.
49 Morgan v. Reasor Corp., 447 P. 2d 638, 647 (1968, S.C. Cal.) (hereafter: Morgan).
50 Under s. 56(1) of the Act, footnote 34, supra. The statutory conditions of taking the note
for value, in good faith and without notice of defences and claims appear in §3-302(1) of
the American U.C.C.
51 Cf R. W. Aigler, "Payees as Holders in Due Course", 36 Yale L.J. 608 (1927).
52 Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs, 137 S.W. 2d 260 (1940, S.C. Ark.).
53 Ibid., at p. 262; emphasis added. Childs was preceded by Buffalo Industrial Bank v. De
Marzio, 296 N.Y.S. 783 (1937, City Ct. of Buffalo), revd on other grounds 6 N.Y.S. 2d
568 (1937, S. C.), where the court found a finance company and a seller to be "a factual
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Yet the close connectedness doctrine should not be taken to
mean that the finance company becomes a party to the contract
for sale. The doctrine is clearly distinguished from the line of cases
holding that an owner of goods selling them through an agent act-
ing in his own name cannot qualify as a holder in due course when
the note evidencing the sale is negotiated to him. The owner in the
latter situation is the "real vendor" of the goods, an original party
to the sale transaction. 4 The finance company on the other hand,
being an original party to the credit-sale arrangement is better de-
scribed as a "participant" in the sale,55 rather than being in privity
under it. It is denied a holder in due course status by virtue of its
proximity to the contract for sale to which it is none the less not a
party.56 Indeed, "The basic philosophy of the holder in due course
status is to encourage free negotiability of commercial paper ...
the closer his relationship to the underlying agreement which is
the source of the note, the less need there is for giving him the ten-
sion free rights. '57 In this framework, the close connectedness doc-
trine is an application of the spirit of the old distinction between a
remote and an immediate party58 to an analogous new fact situa-
tion.
It is quite apparent that the pre-existing arrangement between
the sale finance company and the seller under which the former
undertook to finance the sale operation of the latter is the basis of
the holding in Federal Discount. Thus, the court spoke there of the
financer's exercise of "a measure of control over the seller's sales
by the requirements laid down with regard to the negotiable
paper".5 9 It also emphasized the fact that "The course of dealings
between the ... [finance company] and the ... [seller] indicates a
relationship much more intimate than that of endorsee or [sic,
should read "and"] endorser in a normal commercial
joint enterprise", because "so far as conditional sales are concerned the management
rests in the far larger part in the hands of the finance companies". Both cases (Childs and
De Marzio) were cited in Federal Discount, supra, footnote I at p. 100 D.L.R., p. 324 O.R.
54 See e.g., Sisemore & Kierbow Co. v. Nicholas, 27 A. 2d 473 (1942, S.C. Pa.);
Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Utley, 439 S.W. 2d 57 (1969, C.A. Ky.).
55 See e.g., Unico v. Owen, supra, footnote 41 at p. 417.
56 Nevertheless, when the finance company and the seller were wholly-owned subsidiaries
of one parent corporation, both could be regarded as "one": Jones v. Approved Bancredit
Corp., 256 A. 2d 739 (1969, S.C. Del.).
57 Unico v. Owen, supra, footnote 41 at p. 410.
58 See footnote 51 and text, supra.
59 Federal Discount, supra, footnote 1, at p. 98 D.L.R., p. 3 2 2 O.R.
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transaction." 60 Under these circumstances, the court's conclusion
was that "To pretend that they were so separate that the transfer
of each note constituted an independent commercial transaction
not affected by the pre-existing arrangements between them would
... be to permit the form to prevail over the substance."'6'
It would appear then that the conclusion of Kirby, J., under
which participation in or knowledge of wrongful acts is the basis
of the "Federal Discount doctrine", 62 is unsupported by the facts of
the latter case as well as by the discussion of the court therein.
Rather, it is the involvement of the finance company in the credit
sale arrangement from its inception that makes it impossible to see
it as a remote purchaser of the note contending to be a holder in
due course.
IV
Had the promissory notes of the debtors in Kon been issued to
the order of Maple Leaf and then negotiated to the Bank of Mont-
real, the fact situation could have fitted easily into the close con-
nectedness doctrine. The Bank of Montreal, by receiving the bulk
of the business in the financing of the purchase of motor homes
under a pre-existing arrangement with Maple Leaf,63 was involved
in the scheme from its inception no less than the finance company
in Federal Discount.
However, the bank and the seller .chose to operate the scheme in
a different manner. Cash was advanced to Maple Leafs" not
against buyers' obligations directed to it, but rather, against
borrowers' obligations directed towards the Bank of Montreal.
Functionally, both methods of sales financing (purchase of re-
tail paper and direct purchase-money loan) lead to the same re-
sult. In each case, goods move from the seller to the buyer, money
moves from the financer to the seller, and the debt ends up run-
ning from the buyer to the financer.65
60 Ibid., at p. 99 D.L.R., p. 323 O.R.
61 Ibid., at pp. 99-100 D.L.R., pp. 323-4 O.R.
62 See footnote I I and text, supra.
63 The elements of the relationship between the Bank of Montreal and Maple Leaf were set
forth by the court in Kon, supra, footnote 4 at pp. 621-2 D.L.R., pp. 519-20 W.W.R.; see
footnote 6 and text, supra. Especially noteworthy are elements 1, 2 and 7 (the existence of
an arrangement between Maple Leaf and the bank, and its implementation).
64 Though the defendants were the borrowers, money was advanced by the bank to its des-
ignated use, i.e., to Maple Leaf. This is quite typical in a case of a secured loan and by it-
self does not indicate close connection.
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Nevertheless, in theory the two financing patterns are entirely
different. In the retail paper purchase situation, the financer sues
the buyer on the obligation to pay for the goods. His title to the
note is "derivative", 66 and unless he is a holder in due course, he is
subject to any defect in the title of a prior party.67 At the same
time, in the direct purchase-money loan, the financer sues the
buyer on a note expressing an obligation under the loan agree-
ment which, conceptually, is separate and distinct from the con-
tract for sale. In the latter situation, whether or not the lender is a
holder in due course appears to be immaterial. The buyer-bor-
rower "did get from the lender what he bargained for in exchange
for his note. '68 He is sued under an independent obligation and
cannot interpose defences arising under his contract with the sell-
er.
It would appear then that denial of holder in due course status,
whether under the close connectedness doctrine or otherwise,
would not affect the purchase-money lender's insulation from the
buyer's defences against the seller. 69 This, however, was not the
view of two American cases, that treated the position of a pur-
chase-money lender entirely as a holder in due course question.70
Finding in each case7 that in taking the note the payee-lender
acted in good faith, each court found him a holder in due course72
65 "There is a substantial similarity between the seller-payee case, where the lender buys the
seller's claim against the purchaser, and ... [the] case where the lender 'buys' the pur-
chaser from the seller ... in order to obtain the purchaser's note in exchange for which
the lender pays the seller's claim against the purchaser": Beneficial Finance Co. of New
Orleans v. Bienemy, 244 So. 2d 275 (1971, C.A. La.) at p. 284; emphasis in the original
(hereafter: Bienemy).
66 Ziegel, Bill C-208, supra, footnote 16 at p. 133.
67 Cf s. 74(b) of the Act.
68 Bienemy, supra, footnote 65 at p. 284.
69 But cf Commercial Credit Plan Inc. v. Beebe, 187 A. 2d 502 (1963 Sup. Ct. Vt.), at p. 506
(hereafter: Beebe); direct lender collecting money with knowledge of the seller's fraud
may be found liable in fraud under the general principle under which "One who accepts
the benefits of another's fraudulent acts, knowing of the methods used, is held to have
adopted those methods as his own, even though he may have been innocent of the fraud
when committed."
70 Waterbury Savings Bank v. Jaroszewski, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1049 (1967, Cir. Ct. Conn.);
Slaughter v. Jefferson Federal Savings and Loan Association, 538 F. 2d 397 (1976, Cir. Ct.
D.C.).
71 In Slaughter, ibid., the court reversed the decision of the court below finding the lender to
be in bad faith and denying it a holder in due course status: 361 F. Supp. 590 (1973, Dist.
Ct. D.C.).
72 A payee may be a holder in due course under the American Code: U.C.C. §3-302(2).
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taking the instrument free from all claims and defences of the
buyer.7 3
The same approach, i.e., treating the position of a direct pur-
chase-money lender as a straight holder in due course question,
was taken in Canada in Beneficial Finance Co. of Canada v. Kulig.7 4
In that case, however, the court applied Federal Discount and
found against the financer.
The result in Kulig commends itself at least for one reason:
finding financers subject to buyer's defences only in the purchase
of retail paper situation would encourage them to abandon that
practice and set up purchase-money loans.7 5 An effective rule
must lead to the same results under each mode of financing.
Yet, as explained, treating the position of the purchase-money
lender as a holder in due course question is erroneous in principle.
Notwithstanding Kulig, the close connectedness doctrine cannot
be applied mechanically to the purchase-money loan situation.76
To overcome the difficulty, suggestions have been made to treat
the closely connected lender and the seller as a principal and
agent or a joint business venture. 77 Since the scope of the agency
extends to the credit extension only,7 8 and the profits of the lender
and the seller, though dependent on each other, are not "joint",79
these suggestions are open to criticism.
Another approach has been to see a financer involved in a
scheme of selling goods as owing a .duty of care to the buyers. Un-
73 However, both courts did not consider U.C.C. §3-305(2), under which the freedom of a
holder in due course from defences is limited generally to "all defences of any party to the
instrument with whom the holder has not dealt ... " emphasis added.
74 (1970), 13 D.L.R. (3d) 134, [1970] 3 O.R. 370 (Co. Ct.) (hereafter: Kulig).
75 Indeed, the occurrence of such a shift is supported by some surveys, Comment,
"Consumer Protection - The Role of Cut-off Devices in Consumer Financing", [1968]
Wis. L. Rev. 505 at pp. 524-5; F. H. Miller, "An Alternative Response to the Supposed
Direct Loan Loophole in the UCCC", 24 Okl. L. Rev. 427 (1970), at pp. 435-7.
76 This was the main criticism on the reasoning of the court made by Ziegel, Bill C-208,
supra, footnote 16 at pp. 131-4. Professor Ziegel adhered to the result of the case.
77 See e.g., Note, "Direct Loan Financing of Consumer Purchases", 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1409
(1972), at pp. 1424-7. The joint venture theory was applied in Canada to the relationship
between a construction company and a financer of a housing project in Central Mortgage
& Housing Corp. v. Graham (1973), 43 D.L.R. (3d) 686 at pp. 703-10, 13 N.S.R. (2d) 183
(S.C.T.D.)
78 See e.g., Bienemy, supra, footnote 65 at p. 283, where the court, though accepting the no-
tion that the seller was an agent of the lender added that "Still, the seller did not sell for
the lender; his function as agent of the lender was to procure borrowers"; emphasis in
the original.
79 Connor v. Great Western Savings and Loan Ass'n, 447 P. 2d 609 (1969, S.C. Cal.) at p. 615
(hereafter: Connor).
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derlying the latter theory is Connor v. Great Western Saving and
Loan Ass'n.80 where a construction financer "became much more
than a lender content to lend money at interest on the security of
real property. It became an active participant in a home construc-
tion enterprise."'s Being found "well aware that the usual buyer of
a home is ill equipped with experience or financial means to dis-
cern ... structural defects",8 2 the lender was charged with "a duty
to the buyers of the homes to exercise reasonable care to protect
them from damages caused by structural defects". 83
Indeed, on the facts of Kon, where the loss was caused by a flaw
in the scheme as well as by lack of capital in Maple Leaf,84 much
could be said about the negligence of the Bank of Montreal.8 5 It is
suggested, however, that apart from any of the above mentioned
theories, the application of Federal Discount to the purchase-
money lender situation can be rationalized on a basis analogous
to that underlying its application in the holder in due course anal-
ysis. Indeed, it is the argument of involvement in the arrangement
from its inception, or of "proximity" to the underlying sale trans-
action, that bars the financer-holder from being a holder in due
course notwithstanding the appearance of a good faith purchase
on his part. The apparent independence of the purchase-money
80 Connor, ibid. Cf also Beebe, supra, footnote 69 at p. 506 (approval of a loan "may be-
come, to the borrower, like an opinion by the lender that the transaction itself is a wise
one"). A case that could-have raised directly the question of a duty of care of an issuer of
credit cards to cardholders, was Payne v. United California Bank, 100 Cal. Rptr 672
(1972, C.A. Col.). Since the court decided that the suit had not been properly maintained
as a class action, it did not deal with the issue.
81 Connor, supra, footnote 79 at p. 616.
82 Ibid., at p. 618.
83 Ibid., at p. 617. In general Connor was distinguished and was not followed; see e.g., Bar-
rera v. State Farm MutualAutomobile Insurance Co., 456 P. 2d 674 (1969, S.C. Col.) at pp.
686, 688; Bradler v. Craig, 79 Cal. Rptr 401 (1969) at pp. 405-8 (C.A.); Jeminson v. Mont-
gomery Real Estate and Company, 210 N.W. 2d 10 (1973, C.A. Mich.) at pp. 12-14. Subse-
quent legislation in California reversed Connor in part: West's Annotated Calfornia Civil
Code §3434 (1970), Stats. 1969, c. 1584 p. 3222, §1. The objection to Connor is based on
the potential of unlimited lender product liability, which is an irrelevant point in regard
to Kon.
84 Kon, supra, footnote 4 at p. 631 D.L.R., p. 530 W.W.R. The flaw in the scheme was "The
failure to take into account the rapid depreciation of the motor homes from heavy use."
85 The fact that the lender "knew or should have known that the developers were inexperi-
enced, undercapitalized, and operating on a dangerously thin capitalization", was one of the
grounds to the holding of Connor, supra, footnote 79 at p. 616, emphasis added. In both
Connor and Kon the lender also extended a direct loan to the seller. Admittedly, however,
the lender and the developer in Connor were in a more intimate relationship than that of
the Bank of Montreal and Maple Leaf in Kon.
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loan transaction should be disregarded on the basis of the same
argument. When the loan is offered through the seller as part and
parcel of the sale, the arrangement is unitary and should be
treated as indivisible. A lender participant thereto from its begin-
ning, should be denied the benefit of what has only the appear-
ance of an independent cause of action.8 6
V
Many aspects of the close connectedness doctrine have not
been settled yet. For example, while some of the cases required
only participation in the arrangement from its inception, 87 others
regarded the control of the financer over the credit terms, not
merely as an indication of that involvement, but rather, as an in-
dependent additional prerequisite. 88 Another problem stems from
the fact that some of the leading cases that were decided under the
doctrine could also be explained on a more traditional basis.
Thus, in Westfield Inv. Co. v. Fellers, the instrument evidencing the
sale contained a printed assignment form designating the plaintiff
finance company as the assignee. The finance company was de-
nied a holder in due course status because "in delivery to its se-
lected dealer of an instrument which for all practical purposes
could be negotiated only to it, [it] became ... inextricably a part of
the original transaction with the purchaser. ...." 89 However, there
were many circumstances in that case indicating actual knowledge
on the part of the finance company of the activities of the seller 0
Also, in Unico v. Owen, though the court emphasized the control
of the finance company on the "standards for the underlying
transaction", 9' the facts of the case disclosed a much more inti-
mate relationship. The financer was "a partnership formed ex-
pressly for the purpose of financing" the seller involved; 92 both
seller and financer were subsidiaries in the same concern. 9
86 The fact that "each of the defendants individually negotiated his respective note with the
bank" (Kon, supra, footnote 4 at p. 630 D.L.R., p. 530 W.W.R.) is immaterial.
87 See e.g., Morgan, supra, footnote 49.
88 See e.g., footnote 41 and text, supra.
89 Supra, footnote 39 at p. 818.
90 On that basis the case was distinguished in James Talcott Inc. v. Shulman, 198 A. 2d 98
(1964, S.C. App. Div. N.J.).
91 Supra, footnote 41 and text.
92 Unico v. Owen, supra, footnote 41 at p. 412.
93 Cf footnote 56, supra.
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There are also uncertainties as to the scope of the doctrine.
With few exceptions 94 American courts applied it only with regard
to consumers. In Unico v. Owen its range was explicitly confined to
"consumer goods transactions". 95 Moreover, in Block v. Ford Mo-
tor Credit Co.,96 in a situation that involved a consumer, the appli-
cation of the close connectedness doctrine was rejected where the
purchaser had capacity to understand the plain language of the in-
strument (he was a Ph.D. business executive), there was no claim
of fraud, and the seller was still in business.
All this raises important questions, legitimately subject to an
ongoing judicial discussion. Nevertheless, by not reading what
was truly said in Federal Discount while reading into it what was
not said, Kon is a step in the wrong direction.
Benjamin Geva*
DEFECTS IN REGISTRATION UNDER THE PERSONAL
PROPERTY SECURITY ACT - HAS THE PENDULUM SWUNG
TOO FAR?
One of the objectives of the Ontario Personal Property Security
Act' (hereafter PPSA) was to simplify registration requirements
and to relax the severity with which courts applying the earlier
registration statutes tended to view errors in the filed documents.
Two recent decisions, Re Bankruptcy of Walter Clarence Martin2
and Re Robert Sist Development Corporation Ltd.,3 show that the
draftsmen have succeeded all too well and that the pendulum may
now have swung too far in the opposite direction. They also show
the importance of understanding the mechanics of the computer-
ized registry system established under the PPSA and its relation-
ship to particular types of mistake in the financing statement.
94 See e.g., Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Machine Works, 214 P. 2d 819 (1950,
Cal. S.C.); International Finance Corp. v. Rieger, 137 N.W. 2d 172 (1965, S.C. Minn.).
95 Supra, footnote 41 at p. 417. This has not been an issue in Canada where the doctrine is
applied also to commercial cases. See e.g., Kulig, supra, footnote 74.
96 286 A. 2d 228 (1972, App. Ct. D.C.).
Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
I R.S.O. 1970, c. 344 as amended.
2 Toronto Bankruptcy Court, Dec. 16, 1977.
3 (1977), 80 D.L.R. (3d) 445, 17 O.R. (2d) 305 (S.C. in Bankruptcy).
